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Abstract
From the perspective of the economics of law, the ruling 
on the first guiding case of China i.e. jump-dealing case 
has great breakthrough significance. It gets rid of the 
constraint of the hypothesis of traditional contract law 
on complete contracts, encourages the self-fulfillment 
of incomplete contract from the logic starting point of 
incomplete contract, highlights the incentive function of 
the remedy for breach of contract and emphasizes that the 
function of contract law is aimed to improve transaction 
efficiency and optimize resource allocation.
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INTRODUCTION
On December 20, 2011, the Supreme People’s Court 
published the first batch of four guiding cases and 
announced that judges should refer to these guiding cases 
when trying similar cases. Such stipulation means that 
these guiding cases have already had substantial legal 
binding force and broken through the traditional thought 
that civil law judges should not make law. Especially the 
first guiding case named “Shanghai Zhongyuan Property 
Consultancy Co., Ltd. v. Tao Dehua Intermediary 
Contract Jump-dealing Case” (hereinafter referred to as 
“Jump-dealing case”) is particularly striking.
According to facts, in the second half of 2008, in 
order to sell the property at issue, the original property 
owner, Li, listed it at multiple real estate agencies. Tao 
Dehua and his wife inspected the property many times 
under the introduction of different real estate agencies. On 
November 27, 2008, an agent from Shanghai Zhongyuan 
Property Consultancy Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred 
to as “Zhongyuan Company”) brought Tao Dehua to 
the property, and both parties signed a Confirmation of 
Prospective Real Estate Purchase (hereinafter referred 
to as “Confirmation”) on the same day. According 
to the provision of Article 2.4 of the Confirmation, 
where, within six months after Tao Dehua inspected the 
property, Tao Dehua, his principal, agent, representative, 
or designee, or any other person associated with him 
concluded a deal regarding the property with any 
third party by using any information, opportunity or 
other condition provided by Zhongyuan Company, 
bypassing Zhongyuan Company, Tao Dehua should 
pay Zhongyuan Company liquidated damages of 1% of 
the actual purchase price for the property as agreed with 
the seller. Zhongyuan Company’s quoted price for the 
property was RMB 1.65 million and its agency fee was 
1% of actual purchase price. However, the quoted price of 
other real estate consultancy company was only RMB 1.45 
million. On November 30, through brokerage of other 
real estate consultancy company, Tao Dehua and the seller 
concluded a real estate purchase contract at a purchase 
price of RMB 1.38 million. Zhongyuan Company filed 
suit against Tao Dehua in Hongkou District People’s 
Court of Shanghai, and alleged that, Tao Dehua, by using 
information provided by Zhongyuan Company regarding 
the property, deliberately bypassed the real estate agency 
and directly concluded a real estate purchase contract 
in private with the seller, and Tao’s act is a malicious 
jump-dealing act in violation of the provisions of the 
Confirmation. Hence, Zhongyuan Company requested 
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the court to order Tao Dehua to pay liquidated damages 
of RMB 16,500. The Court made the first instance ruling 
as follows: the defendant Tao Dehua should, within 10 
days from the effective date of the ruling, pay liquidated 
damages of RMB 13,800 to Zhongyuan Company. After 
the ruling, Tao Dehua filed an appeal. On September 4, 
2009, the No. 2 Intermediate People’s Court of Shanghai 
issued a civil judgment (No. 1508 [2009], Final, Civil 
Division II, No. 2 Intermediate, Shanghai) as follows: 
(1) the civil judgment (No. 912 [2009], First, Civil 
Division III, Hongkou) was overruled; and (2) the claim 
of Zhongyuan Company that Tao Dehua should pay 
liquated damages of RMB 16,500 was not granted. 
    The ruling on the first guiding case of China i.e. Jump-
dealing case maintains the credibility in the dealing of 
real estate agency market, promotes the fair competition 
of market and protects the legal rights and interests of 
property buyers. From the perspective of the economics 
of law, the case has milestone significance, as it gets rid 
of the hypothesis of complete contract under traditional 
contract law, encourages the self-fulfillment of incomplete 
contract from the logic starting point of incomplete 
contract, highlights the incentive function of the remedy 
for breach of contract and emphasizes that the function 
of contract law is aimed to make resources flow to in the 
most valuable direction through voluntary exchange.
1.  EFFICIENCY: THE FINAL PURSUIT OF 
CONTRACT LAW
According to traditional jurisprudence, law is imitating 
justice, and if the law is against justice, it can be a kind 
of conflict or satire, so justice should be the highest 
value appeal of a judicial decision. However, in the 
economics of law, contractual relationship contains 
complete economic logic and contract law’s economic 
function is to execute the agreement that can promote 
efficiency, so the court should make efforts to find out 
the efficiency clause that can be used to optimize the 
total benefits of contract parties. As Richard Posner said, 
considering that judges only have limited remedy power 
and the society values diversity, efficiency may be the 
sole social value that judges can promote efficiently. The 
“efficiency” highlights that social welfare is maximized 
based on the maximization of personal interests, that 
is to say, it achieves Pareto optimality through judicial 
action. However, efficiency, wealth maximization and 
welfare maximization maybe have to conflict with 
fairness, equality and justice. With respect to the jump-
dealing case, since Tao Dehua signed the confirmation 
with Zhongyuan Company voluntarily, it indicates that 
Tao Dehua has known and would like to undertake the 
obligation of not jump-dealing. According to the principle 
of honesty and credibility, under traditional contract 
law, Tao Dehua should have performed the confirmation 
seriously as any noncompliance is illegal and should 
be blamed. However, efficiency principle requires that 
the total compensation between both parties involved 
in dealing shall be maximized, so the property buyer 
may select breach of contract if the compliance of the 
Confirmation would make the total compensation between 
both parties involved in dealing reduce, and such breach 
belongs to a kind of efficient choice and worth being 
protected by law. 
Because Tao Dehua made the promise of not jump-
dealing before implementation, the time difference 
between both would make the cost of implementation 
uncertain. For example, Tao Dehua didn’t know whether 
other agencies would offer more favorable prices. If 
other agencies offer more favorable prices, Tao Dehua’s 
cost of implementation would increase. Because scarce 
resources need to be used for implementation, so the cost 
of implementation will exceed benefits. In contrary, if 
Zhongyuan Company’s quoted price is the sole and the 
most favorable one, Tao Dehua’s cost of implementation 
may be reduced. In case that Zhongyuan Company’s 
quoted price is the sole and most favorable one, Tao 
Dehua’s cost of implementation of Confirmation is RMB 
16,500, Tao Dehua would obtain the consumer surplus 
of RMB 333,500 through cooperation with Zhongyuan 
Company and Zhongyuan Company would obtain the 
agency fee of RMB 16,500; if Tao Dehua still selects 
to implement the Confirmation and cooperate with 
Zhongyuan Company after knowing that he could 
make dealing at RMB 1.38 million with other agency, 
Tao Dehua’s cost of implementation would be RMB 
272,700, his consumer surplus would be RMB 77,300 
and Zhongyuan Company would obtain the agency 
fee of RMB 16,500; if Tao Dehua selects to violate the 
Confirmation and makes jump-dealing at RMB 1.38 
million, he would face the liquidated damages of RMB 
13,800 but he would save the property payment of RMB 
270,000 and the agency fee of RMB 2,700, his consumer 
surplus would be RMB 592,400, and Zhongyuan 
Company may obtain the liquidated damages of RMB 
13,800. Therefore, Tao Dehua’s jump-dealing choice 
without cooperation with Zhongyuan Company will 
maximize total benefits, which meet efficiency principle. 
When judges make judicial decision, they shall maintain 
such optimal choice, that is to say, judges shouldn’t 
prohibit the freedom of property buyers to make jump-
dealing after trade-off.
From the above, we can find that sometimes there are 
some conflicts between justice and efficiency, but in fact 
it seems that such conflicts can be resolved. If justice 
and efficiency both have values and one has no absolute 
priority to the other, they should reach a compromise 
when having conflicts and judges have the responsibility 
to make a judgment and balance between efficiency 
and equality. Justice is a kind of subjective value while 
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efficiency is a kind of objective value. If a value judgment 
is made at the possibly minimum level, efficiency 
principle requires that lawyer’ behavior should avoid 
waste of resources. Therefore, law interpretation should 
not be based on justice but by efficiency. In the economics 
of law, contract law has the aim to maximize efficiency or 
welfare but has to meet the Pareto principle.
2.  INCOMPLETENESS: HYPOTHESIS OF 
CONTRACT LAW
According to traditional contract theory, all  the 
agreements made on the actual intention of both parties 
are complete. In accordance with the terms and conditions 
of the Article 55 of the General Principles of the Civil 
Law on the requirements of validity of civil legal act and 
the terms and conditions of the Article 7 and 9 of Contract 
Law, the requirements of validity of contract include that 
contract parties shall have the corresponding disposing 
capacity of signing contract, contract parties’ intentions 
shall be actual and contract shall not violate law or social 
public interests. The Confirmation in the Jump-dealing 
Case meets the requirements of validity of contract, so 
the contract is complete in the economics of law. When 
the contract parties have disputes on contract terms, court 
may force the parties to implement the contract. However, 
from the perspective of the economics of law, the contract 
is incomplete. Incomplete contract is made because of 
limited personal rationality, complicated and uncertain 
external environment and asymmetric and incomplete 
information. The Confirmation was signed when 
Tao Dehua did not know all the information about the 
property, so the Confirmation is incomplete and it will 
make optimal dealing unachieved, one contract party has 
the risk of being “ripped off” by the other party, personal 
cost and benefits are externalized and contract efficiency 
can’t be achieved.
The law and economics have different standards 
to identify whether a contract is complete or not, and 
as a result, the Confirmation is complete in law but 
it is incomplete in economics. Based on the different 
standards on the incompleteness of contract in law and 
economics, incomplete contracts can be divided into legal 
incomplete contracts and economic incomplete contracts, 
so the former refers to the contracts without meeting the 
requirements of legal effect and the latter refers to the 
contracts meeting the requirements of legal effect but in 
lack of efficiency because of limited personal rationality, 
incomplete information and other unpredictable factors 
at the time of signing. Traditional contract law has 
detailed stipulations on the identification standards, 
legal responsibilities and remedy means for incomplete 
contracts, but it rarely stipulates economic incomplete 
contracts. Our contract law only has provisions about the 
economic incomplete conditions like force majeure and 
change of circumstances etc. Force majeure and change of 
circumstances may happen after signing contract, which 
can’t be forecast, avoided or remedied before signing 
contract, and their occurrence will change the basis of 
implementation of contract fundamentally. If such contract 
is forced to be implemented, it will damage the economics 
aspect of dealing. Therefore, the legal effects of force 
majeure and change of circumstances shall be determined.
However, our existing written legal documents have no 
stipulations on the economic incomplete contracts caused 
by limited rationality and asymmetric, incomplete and 
uncertain information etc., mainly because the factors of 
economic incompleteness are very complicated, including 
the objective ones like force majeure and subjective ones 
like limited rationality and asymmetric, incomplete and 
uncertain information, the connotation and extension of 
which can’t be described accurately in legal language , and 
besides, it is very difficult to put to the proof on incomplete 
contracts. Because there is no legal provision on economic 
incomplete contracts, it has made some disorder in judicial 
decision. For example, the first-instance court may identify 
economic incomplete contracts based on the standards of 
legal incompleteness. However, luckily, the intermediate 
court made the judicial decision that Tao Dehua didn’t 
undertake the obligations due to jump-dealing, which 
completely proves that the Confirmation’s incompleteness 
was identified by law in the case, breaks through the 
hypothesis of traditional contract law on incompleteness 
and has great guiding significance. 
3.  SELF-FULFILLMENT: THE WAYS OF 
FULFILLING INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS
In reality, because of the factors like complicated, 
risky and uncertain social interactions, human’s limited 
rationality, the existence of transaction fee, incomplete 
and asymmetric information and obscure language usage, 
there is almost no economic incomplete contract since 
it is impossible to predict all the conditions involved in 
a contract before determining each party’s rights and 
obligations. Generally, the fulfillment of legal incomplete 
contracts will be assisted by a third-party executor, while 
the fulfillment of economic incomplete contracts can’t 
get the most economic result by court enforcement. 
Economic incomplete contracts shall highlight more 
self-fulfillment but not court enforcement. The self-
fulfillment of contract means personal punishment clause 
but not court enforcement is made for the dealing party 
that can be predicted to have the possibility to violate 
contract, that is to say, a contract shall be fulfilled by 
dealing parties voluntarily but not under the rule of 
law. Personal punishment clauses contains two aspects: 
firstly, the loss from specific capital investment due to 
termination of dealing relationship; secondly, the loss of 
devaluation of credibility.
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According to the case, if Tao Dehua’s valuation on the 
property was RMB 2 million, at the time, Zhongyuan 
Company’s quoted price was RMB 1.65 million, Tao 
Dehua found that other real estate consultancy company’s 
quoted price was only RMB 1.45 million, and at last the 
property owner Li would like to sell the property at RMB 
1.38 million after coordination as Li’s valuation on the 
property was only RMB 1.2 million.
Table I  
Surplus Distribution Under Remedies for Breach of Contract (Unit: RMB 10,000) 
Property 
valuation
Surplus distribution 
without remedy for 
breach of contract
Surplus distribution under 
enforcement as the remedy for 
breach of contract
Surplus distribution under 
compensation for damages as the 
remedy for breach of contract
Tao Dehua 200 60.62 33.35 59.24
Zhongyuan Company 165 0 1.65 1.38
A property 145 1.38 0 1.38
Li 120 18 45 18
Total 80 80 80
According to Table 1, if Tao Dehua would not 
like to buy the property at RMB 1.65 million through 
Zhongyuan Company but selects to violate contract 
because of other real estate consultancy company, 
Zhongyuan Company files suit against Tao Dehua, 
the court does not grant any remedy to Zhongyuan 
Company, that is to say, Tao Dehua may make jump-
dealing without any cost, let’s think about the benefits 
of the four parties. Tao Dehua may obtain the difference 
between his valuation and actual purchase price, i.e. 
RMB 620,000, but he has to pay the agency fee of RMB 
13,800, so his net benefits are RMB 606,200. Zhongyuan 
Company’s benefits are zero. The benefits of some real 
estate consultancy company are the agency fee of RMB 
13,800. Li’s benefits are the difference between his 
valuation and actual purchase price, i.e. RMB 180,000. 
See Table I - “ Surplus Distribution Under Remedies for 
Breach of Contract” . 
If the court accepts the suit of Zhongyuan Company 
and orders Tao Dehua to fulfill contract, that is to say, 
Tao Dehua has to purchase the property at RMB 1.65 
million, Tao Dehua may obtain the difference between his 
valuation and actual purchase price, i.e. RMB 350,000, 
but he has to pay the agency fee of RMB 16,500, so his 
net benefits are RMB 333,500. Zhongyuan Company 
may obtain the agency fee of RMB 16,500 and the 
benefits of some real estate consultancy company 
are zero. Li’s benefits are the difference between his 
valuation and actual purchase price, i.e. RMB 450,000. 
See Table I - “Surplus Distribution Under Remedies for 
Breach of Contract”. 
If the court accepts the suit of Zhongyuan Company 
and orders Tao Dehua to follow the Confirmation, that 
is to say, Tao Dehua must pay the liquidated damages of 
RMB 1.65 million to Zhongyuan Company, Tao Dehua 
may obtain the difference between his valuation and 
actual purchase price, i.e. RMB 620,000, but he has to 
pay the agency fee of RMB 13,800 and the  liquidated 
damages of RMB 13,800, so his net benefits are RMB 
592,400.  Zhongyuan Company  may obtain the 
liquidated damages of RMB 13,800 and the benefits of 
some real estate consultancy company are RMB 13,800. 
Li’s benefits are the difference between his valuation 
and actual purchase price, i.e. RMB 180,000. See Table 
I - “Surplus Distribution Under Remedies for Breach of 
Contract ”. 
Now, when we make comparisons under the three 
conditions i.e. without remedy, under enforcement and 
compensation for damages, we can find that different 
remedies have the same total benefits, while different 
remedies will affect the distribution of surplus value. 
For the signing parties of the Confirmation, the surplus 
distribution is more in favor of the promisee in case of 
having no legal remedy, while it will be more in favor of 
the promisor in case of having legal remedy. From the 
point of view of protecting consumer’s interests, surplus 
distribution shall be more in favor of the promisee, so it is 
fair without remedy. From the point of view of resource 
allocation, the surplus distribution shall be more in favor 
of the party with higher valuation in case of having no 
legal remedy while it will be more in favor of the party 
with lower valuation in case of having legal remedy. 
From the point of view of optimal resource allocation, it 
is efficient without remedy. From the benefits of both real 
estate consultancy companies, the surplus distribution will 
be more in favor of the party with lower valuation in case 
of having no legal remedy while it will be more in favor 
of the party with higher valuation in case of having legal 
remedy. From the point of view of competition promotion, 
it is economic without remedy.
Based on above analysis, we can find it may be a 
better choice for dealing parties to find their ways of self-
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fulfillment without legal remedy, which will be helpful for 
resource allocation towards the party with higher valuation, 
promotes utilization efficiency, and encourages agencies 
to improve their service level and tries their best to find 
the best property source information but not “kidnaps” 
consumers by confirmation and other agreements. 
CONCLUSION
From the above, we can find the Jump-dealing case 
as the first guiding case of China has breakthrough 
significance in legal principle, premise of application and 
remedy means, and highlights the important function of 
efficiency value in judicial decision. Besides that, the 
Jump-dealing Case as a guiding case also has milestone 
value as it has broken the tradition that only written 
laws could be taken as the basis of judgment in civil law 
countries and promoted the integration between civil law 
system and common law system. Can any case be taken 
as guiding case? The answer is not. Taking the contract 
law as example, the existing standard documents have 
detailed stipulations on the identification standards and 
remedy means for legal incomplete contracts, so those 
written legal standards shall be referred to when judgment 
is made on legal incomplete contracts. However, for 
economic incomplete contracts, because of the difficulty 
in legal description and complicated uncertain factors, it is 
more appropriate to refer to guiding case in judgment. 
The Article 7 of the Provisions of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Case Guidance stipulates that: local 
people’s courts at various levels shall refer to the guiding 
cases published by the Supreme People’s Court”. Those 
guiding cases come from the effective cases of the 
people’s courts at various levels, judges’ ruling may guide 
future judicial practice to some extent and judges have 
certain of legislation function. For a truly novel case, 
it may establish a precedent to guide future cases, so 
judges shall follow the precedent when trying with future 
similar cases and they don’t have to decide each case 
from the beginning, which is a kind of economic choice. 
In the Jump-dealing case, its efficiency value will have 
great significance for future jump-dealing cases and even 
contract cases. As Posner said, maybe no mark about 
economic thinking can be found in future cases, but if the 
precedent affecting future cases is established based on 
the desire for efficiency promotion in a implicit or definite 
way, reflecting the legislation action of judges, those cases 
can be said to be decided based on efficiency. Therefore, 
even if a fraction of a case concerns efficiency, law may 
be said to be efficient.
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